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Abstract
Over the past three decades, since its invention,
the Internet has evolved in both its sheer volume and
usage. The Internet’s core protocol, Internet Protocol
(IP), has proven its usability and effectiveness to
support a communication network. However, current
Internet usage requires more than a communication
network due to a shift in the nature of Internet
applications from simple email application to large
content producers such as NetFlix, Google, Amazon,
etc. Named Data Networking (NDN) is one of the
few initiatives/projects addressing the shortcomings of
the current Internet architecture and intends to move
the Internet toward a content distribution architecture.
In this paper, we conduct a brief survey of secu-
rity topics/problems inherent to the NDN architecture.
Specifically, we describe current known problems and
propose solutions to major security problems.
1. Introduction
According to a most recent forecast by Cisco [1],
the content delivery network (e.g. Netflix, Akamai and
etc.) has carried about 39% of the global Internet
traffic by 2014. By 2019, this number is projected
to grow up to 62%. Such growth rate leads to one
major observation apropos the current usage of the
Internet: while originally designed for end-to-end com-
munication, today’s Internet is mainly used as a content
distribution network. As the capacity and type of ap-
plications of the Internet keeps growing, this disparity
could put more pressure on the existing architecture,
which it was not designed to handle. Adapting the
Internet Architecture to its current usage would require
complicated fixes and, in some cases, re-engineering
key components.
Information-Centric Networking (ICN) [2] is an
emerging movement in the Internet architecture revo-
lution proposed to address the mismatch of the current
architecture and its usage. ICN proposes new designs
aimed at reshaping the Internet into a content dis-
tribution architecture. One of those design is Named
Data Networking (NDN) [3], [4]. NDN is one of the
five research projects funded by NSF under its Future
Internet Architecture Program, which embodies the
concepts in ICN. The basic idea behind NDN is simple:
instead of using packets that name the end hosts,
name the datagrams themselves. In such a manner,
the communication-centric network is turned into an
information-centric network, which naturally addresses
the content delivery and mobility support challenges.
While the Internet was originally designed as a com-
munication network, the emergence of large content
providers such as Google, NetFlix, Amazon, etc. has
lead to several changes to the Internet Architecture.
Among others, Content Delivery Networks (CDN)
service providers use parallel TCP connections [5] and
WAN acceleration [6] to disseminate the content closer
to consumers. In NDN architecture, the content is vir-
tually cached in every router, thus eliminating the need
for CDN services while providing same benefits with
in-network memory. Such simple and straight forward
solution demonstrates how an architectural change in
the Internet design can intrinsically solve problems that
would take complicated undertaking otherwise.
Though there are many interesting topics in NDN,
we limit this survey within the scope of security. This
paper is organized as follows: Section 2 talks about
the basic concepts of NDN, current development and
its security solution. Section 3 describes the difference
between IP and NDN with a focus on security, their
pros and cons, and open questions in NDN. In section
4, we propose some possible solutions for the ques-
tions. Section 5 concludes this paper.
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2. Background
2.1. Overview
NDN defines two types of packets: Interest and Data.
Interest packets contain the name of a data chunk that
the user is looking for. Data packets contain the actual
content associated with the specified name. The data
retrieval in NDN can be considered as a pull model. A
data chunk is fetched when requested by an interest.
And the interest should be sent out by a user who needs
the data. One major difference in NDN is that network
now is treated as an entity that has the information
we need. While in IP world, the network is more
of a transparent infrastructure that passes information
along.
NDN runs the forwarding functionality based on
named data chunks. Routers use the Pending Interest
Table (PIT) and the Forwarding Information Base
(FIB) to decide where packets should be sent. The
Content Store (CS) acts as a cache to speed up some
of the requests. If an Interest hits in a router’s CS, the
corresponding data packet will be returned from the
local CS. Otherwise, the router forwards the Interest
to its next hop based on some pre-computed strategy.
The namespace in NDN is almost unbounded be-
cause it assumes the name of a packet can be any
string, any length. A current implementation of the
namespace is the URL-like semantic hierarchical labels
delineated by ’/’. Such nomenclature clearly defines
the relationship among multiple data chunks, which is
the fundamental of the trust model to be described. In
addition to the name field and content field, every NDN
packet has a signature signed by the data producer
that assures the integrity of a packet. While validating
a data packet with a given key is trivial, the main
challenge lies in determining if a key is authenticate
for a packet. To address this problem, a hierarchical
key space structures the authentication chain.
2.2. Security and Privacy in NDN
Smetters and Jacobson first proposed three prop-
erties for a receiver to verify when receiving a data
packet: validity, provenance, and relevance [7]. They
also gave the idea of self-certifying names such that
validity can be verified by running SHA-1 against the
content and comparing with its name.
The authentication chain in NDN is described in
[8]. A blog website framework depicts the trust model
where the root key signs the administrator key, the
administrator key signs the other administrator keys,
any of the administrator key signs the author key, and
Figure 1. Blog Trust Model [8]
the author key signs corresponding articles. Figure 1
illustrates the visual relationship in this blog website
example. The authentication across different names-
paces could be very complicated. Thus, it is necessary
to automate the authentication process. A Trust schema
is designed to allow such automation. By using a
semantic rule pattern in names, a consumer can analyze
the names and parse them like regular expressions to
figure out the relationship.
To minimize the threat by a compromised consumer
or producer, the keys [9] have a lifetime property.
Each key is created based on the minimum privilege
principle. The less privilege a key has, the shorter its
lifetime. In such a way, even if a user is compromised,
he/she can only use the key for a limited amount of
time, which limits the potential damage.
Figure 2 illustrates how access control is designed in
name-based key distribution system. A group contains
some producers and some consumers, producing or
consuming data of particular interests. The Namespace
manager acts as the Certificate Authority (CA) to give
out root certificates. In a typical scenario, the names-
pace manager holds private keys from consumers in
the group. Then it creates a public/private key pair
for the group. Since the public key can be transferred
in plain text, it is directly given to the producer
without encryption. The private key is encrypted by
each consumer’s public key respectively and sent to
each consumer. A consumer can later decrypt using
its local private key to get the group private key.
Once the producer has the group public key and the
consumer has the group private key, the user access
control is done. Next, the producer needs to set up the
content access control. The producer uses the group
public key to encrypt a symmetric content key and
sends it to its consumers. The consumer can decrypt it
using its group private key. Now, both ends have the
symmetric key. In this way, the producer can encrypt
the content using the content key. And consumer can
decrypt content using the same key.
Another topic in security is the Denial-of-Serive
(DoS) attack. In IP architecture, despite several re-
search works, no efficient, and accurate solution has
Figure 2. Named-based Access Control [9]
been found so far. Most DoS require monitoring traffic
using NetFlow and conducting offline analsysis of
traffic flows. Such methods are slow relatively to the
speeds of sophisticated attacks, such as Distributed
DoS (DDoS). Unlike the current Internet architecture,
NDN has natural advantages in preventing DoS attacks.
Since NDN addressing is based on content names
rather than destination (end hosts) addresses, it is
almost impossible to direct all requests to a designated
spot as is required in a typical DoS attack. The CS
in NDN routers plays a major role in mitigating DoS
attacks by reducing the load on data/content producers.
However, researchers soon realized there are similar
attacks in NDN. Despite NDN’s ability to effortlessly
combat DoS attacks, researchers have found its vul-
nerabilities in other type of attacks such as Interest
flooding attack, as explained in [10]. Basically, by
excessively requesting data within a certain namespace,
a router could soon use up its memory and PIT entries,
thus leading to denial of service for other users served
by the same router [11].
Cache pollution is also a potential category of attack
in NDN [12]. An adversary could leverage a Bot-net to
fill up a router’s local CS with rarely requested content
in order to downgrade the service quality for other
users.
Cache privacy problem proposed in [13] is a more
targeted threat on user. An adversary can decide
whether a user has requested some particular data in
a following way. The adversary first requests for the
content C that a user could have requested and logs
the delay d. Then it requests another data chunk C ′
twice that user must have not requested. Thus, for the
first time, delay will be d1 and the second time delay
will be d2, where d1 >d2, since the second request hits
the cache. The adversary can therefore know whether
C is cached by comparing d and d2.
3. Advantages and Disadvantages of NDN
3.1. Comparison between IP and NDN
From a high level perspective, NDN architecture
has a similar structure as IP architecture. Both share
the structure of hourglass with narrow waist. In IP
architecture, the narrow waist is IP packets serving
as a common layer across all types of underlying
networks and upper applications. In NDN, the narrow
waist is NDN packets serving as the common layer.
Both IP and NDN follow Clark’s end-to-end principle
[14]. The routers do not care what kind of applications
is utilizing the packets, routers only take care of the
packets forwarding. And both architectures appear as
layered structures. Either IP or NDN stands as an
outstanding abstract layer that provides service for all
the upper layer applications.
The most significant difference between IP and
NDN is the change of service type. The traditional
scheme of delivering data to a destination now be-
comes a new scheme of fetching data associated with
a particular name. IP routers are stateless, they do
not store any information about the packets they have
processed. While NDN routers are stateful, requested
packets are cached in CS not only for acceleration
but also affect the forwarding strategy a router makes.
In terms of the architectural design, there are several
pros and cons existing between IP and NDN. We only
discuss from a security perspective.
Network layer security is a significant improvement
in NDN that IP does not originally support. Through
the use of certificates, every data packet in NDN is
signed at the producer and can be verified at the
consumer via keys as explained earlier. Per-packet
encryption add a security guarantee in network layer. In
IP architecture, security is implemented through end-
to-end channel by upper layer protocols like (Secure
Socket Layers) SSL. These protocols only provides
limited security support for applications as they es-
tablish a secure communication channel rather than
securing the contents. However, several major proto-
cols in IP such as BGP, OSPF, ICMP and etc. are not
encrypted. These unsecured protocols could be utilized
to launch attacks. By requiring a signature on every
packet, NDN effectively addresses the integrity and
provenance of a packet.
An advantage of IP over NDN is its many years of
engineering evaluation (over 30 years) by billions of
users, which has ultimately proved its effectiveness and
usability. In contrast, NDN is a relatively new concepts
in its experimental phase. As of the time of this
writing, for practical purposes, NDN is implemented
on top of IP on its major cross-continent testbed.
Without the actual development of router hardware
(ASICs) to handle the many components of NDN and
further public testing, it is unfair to compare IP and
NDN despite many foreseen theoretical advantages
the latter guarantees. As with many protocols, only
extensive public use can reveal major shortcomings. In
the case of TCP, congestion problems were found after
DARPAnet was put into use. In addition, the more time
a protocol spends in non-experimental use, the more
sophisticated cyber attacks become. NDN must also
pass this test of time.
3.2. Open Questions
As mentioned previously, there are several key con-
cerns in NDN security. In this section, we discuss them
in the following order: (i) key distribution; (ii) key
revocation; (iii) Interest flood; and (iv) cache pollution.
NDN key distribution scheme follows the trust
model discussed in the previous section. However,
a few problems are also exposed in such a trust
model. First, since the actual content is encrypted by
symmetric key, an attacker can use brute force to crack
the encrypted content. Current computational power
can easily crack a 56-bit DES encryption system in
minutes. Increasing the length of the keys can prevent
such possibility. However, a long keys would lead
to overhead at the router, which could cause low
throughput and/or unexpectedly high delays. Moreover,
the major problem lies in the namespace manager.
The namespace manager needs to store every single
public key of a consumer. Considering a large group of
consumers, the space to store these keys could be very
large and the key management could also be of low
efficiency. Such a centralized manager is similar to the
certificate authority (CA) in IP world, which is prone
to leaking all the keys when compromised. Besides, the
trust schema as interpreted as a chain of security rules
is dependent on the namespace design. Since NDN
leaves the choice of data names to the application,
there needs to be some forcible rules to prevent attacks
by maliciously constructing the name. In a simple
trust schema, the risk of failing an authentication is
high when rules are too simple. A robust way is
to apply multi-level chained authentication. However,
this inevitably lowers the efficiency because the chain
needs to be walked through every time.
One possible way of key revocation is by nega-
tive statements. A user can explicitly announce the
revocation of his key to the public. Thereafter, other
users in the network can thus react by updating their
local configuration respectively [15]. However, this
negative statement is not guaranteed to be received
by everyone. A malicious attacker could: fill a packet
with harmful content, respond to Interests and sign
the packet with revoked key. If the attacker manages
to prevent a target user from receiving the revocation
statement, this attack could work. On the other hand,
if a key is compromised, all the keys generated by this
compromised key need to be revoked correspondingly.
Due to the multi-layered hierarchy in key privileges,
there is no guarantee that no missed key can still exist
and be used.
A relatively effective way is to make the origin
owner of the key to revoke it. But sometimes it is
impossible because the user might still need the key.
Even it is possible, the problem of reachability still
exists. And the ultimate problem is how to limit the
number of affected users if the key is compromised.
Though NDN can prevent the regular type of DoS
attack pretty well, there is an equivalent type of attack
in NDN realm, Interest flood [16]. An adversary cannot
target a specific host or router but it can target a
namespace. If the name he requests is (i) unique and a
particular host is the lone producer for its correspond-
ing namespace, (ii) can respond to the request, (iii)
and provides the corresponding data exclusively, the
adversary can make use of this name to plan an at-
tack. All the interests passing through the intermediate
routers will be forwarded towards that host. In such a
way, the adversary needs to make sure that the interests
are passed along by the routers and every packet he
requests has a unique name that only resides in that
host. Then he needs to keep sending out interests
towards the target. As a consequence, the PIT could
effectively be depleted by such an excessive amount
of interests, which eventually leads to disruption of
service.
As for cache pollution, the ultimate goal is to destroy
cache localization and deteriorate the link utilization.
An adversary can compromise a small set of consumers
and use them to issue interests. By carefully requesting
for unpopular content, the adversary could force the
router to cache those unpopular content in order to
deplete its available local CS space. Once the CS is
filled with unpopular content from an attacker, other
consumers would need to fetch data from further
places. This essentially exacerbates link utilization and
throughput and affects all the connected users.
4. Possible Solutions
Centralized namespace management A central-
ized namespace manager may lead to several security
threats that endanger a wide range of users. As a
single point of failure, it also inherits the shortcom-
ings any centralized system. We propose a distributed
namespace controller for several reasons, namely, risk
containment, and efficiency. For reliability purposes,
it is crucial to have some sort of redundancy in any
critical part of a big system such as a big network.
Such redundancy prevents the system from completely
shutting off in case of a failure. For risk containment
purposes, potential threats (such as in cases where a
key is compromised) can be discovered and contained
at the domain level. A distributed namespace manager
is also more efficient. Syncing across few managers
is more efficient and effective compared to synching
across all routers.
Interest flood Two possible solutions can help miti-
gate the negative effects of Interest flood: interest load
monitoring and policing. On a router level, interest
traffic can be monitored in time and analyzed on the
fly. To reach near real-time performance, sampling
techniques, such as those featured in NetFlow, can
be used. In the event where the interest load for
a particular namespace reaches a threshold, interests
may be dropped selectively. Such policing techniques
increases the probability that some portion of the
bandwith is always left for non-malicious interest in
the same namespace.
Cache pollution To prevent the problem of cache
pollution, we propose using a split content store at
the router level. A single CS can be implemented
as 2 separate memory slots. By monitoring cache
occupancy in time, unpopular cache occupants can be
migrated to the smaller slot of the CS. For effectiveness
reasons, such migrations can only be performed at
regular intervals, τ . After every τ units of time, a
ranking/sorting of cache occupants by the number
of hits/access determines the least recently accessed,
which are then migrated to the smaller CS slot. Entries
in the CS can also be timed to allow eviction of
stale content and free the space. Such popularity-
based allocations would ensure that popular content
is available and close to consumers, thus allowing for
a high performance network.
5. Conclusion
Ever since Van Jacobson’s seminal talk in 2006,
ICN community has made significant strides to mak-
ing ICN designs a reality. The NDN architecture,
in particular, has attracted a lot of researchers and
computer scientists. As a result working prototypes of
NDN architecture and a cross-continent testbed have
made significant expansion possible through research.
Theoretically, NDN will solve several problems that IP
has been unable to address efficiently over its several
decades of existence. In security, NDN addresses se-
curity challenges such as DoS attacks naturally and
in-router data caching provides more efficient CDN
service. However, NDN brings its new security chal-
lenges/concerns inherent to its architecture such as
interest flooding, cache poisoning, key management
problems, that are more or less significant depending
on the nature or sensitivity of data. In this paper,
we proposed potential solutions to 3 major NDN
security problems. We propose three solutions, namely,
distributed namespace management, interest load mon-
itoring and policing, and a two-way split Content
Store, to alleviate and in same cases, eliminate security
threats posed by centralized namespace management,
interest flood, and cache pollution, respectively.
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